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Abstract
People exhibit impaired recall for highly self-threatening information that describes them, a phenomenon called the mnemic
neglect effect (MNE). We hypothesized that the MNE extends to recall for information that highly threatens an individual’s
important in-group identity. We tested our hypothesis in two experiments in which participants read behaviors depicted
as enacted by either in-group members (Experiment 1 ¼ American and Experiment 2 ¼ British) or out-group members
(Andorrans). Participants recalled identity-threatening behaviors poorly when enacted by in-group members but not when
enacted by out-group members. Additional results evinced in-group favoritism in (1) evaluations of the two groups and (2) trait
judgments made from the behaviors, but only on traits central to the self. Finally, mediational analyses suggested that the
group-driven memory differences are plausibly due to the global between-group evaluation differences but not the perceived
between-group trait judgment differences.
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Research on the mnemic neglect effect (MNE; Sedikides et al.,
2016) shows that, when one is threatened by information
implying important (or central) personal shortcomings, this
information is later recalled poorly. The MNE does not reflect
a general tendency toward poor recall for negative information:
No recall deficit emerges when (1) central information
describes another and unknown person or (2) negative informa-
tion is not particularly self-threatening (e.g., is peripheral).
Thus, in the MNE, self-threat, and not simply negativity,
prompts poor recall.
The MNE presumably occurs because self-threat posed by
central negative information induces (1) shallow information
processing and (2) separation in memory of the negative infor-
mation from the (mostly positive) self-concept. These mechan-
isms impair incorporation of self-threatening information into
an individual’s corpus of self-knowledge. In theory, the impair-
ment renders the threatening information hard to find in a mem-
ory search, culminating in poor recall (but not in poor
recognition) for that information (Cheston et al., 2018; Green
et al., 2008; Pinter et al., 2011; Saunders, 2011; Sedikides &
Green, 2004; Zengel et al., 2015, 2018).
The literature has so far been concerned with the MNE in the
context of personal memories. We wondered whether the MNE
is also present in memories for behaviors enacted by others.
Social identity theory (Abrams et al., 2005; Tajfel & Turner,
1986) suggests that this might occur. The theory proposes that
some in-groups are particularly important to how people think
about themselves. These self-important in-groups are typically
evaluated positively and prompt a positive self-view. Thus,
when information threatens a self-important in-group, people
may also experience a self-threat (Petriglieri, 2011; Schmitt
et al., 2000).
Linking these ideas to MNE, we hypothesized that, when
others are members of a self-important in-group, an individual
will evince poor recall for the others’ negative behaviors. How-
ever, as per the MNE, this recall deficit (1) will occur only for
self-central negative behaviors, and not unimportant (periph-
eral) behaviors, and (2) will not be observed for the self-
central behaviors when enacted by members of groups that are
not self-important.
Results from existing studies fit our hypothesis but do not
unequivocally support it. Sahdra and Ross (2007) found that
individuals exhibited impaired recall for real-world in-group
member behaviors. However, the behaviors used in their
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research were participants’ own personal memories. As such,
their studies could not exert control over the characteristics
of the memories recalled. Given these potential confounds, it
is unclear whether self-threat from the negative in-group beha-
viors per se, and not other behavior characteristics, impaired
recall. In contrast, the experimental paradigm used by Rotella
and Richeson (2013) pointed to self-threat prompted by others’
behaviors as a recall-impairing mechanism. When experimen-
tal scenarios, which described the negative behaviors of others,
were said to refer to in-group member behavior, reader scenario
recall was impaired. No such effect was observed when scenar-
ios were said to refer to out-group member behaviors. How-
ever, these authors did not examine whether recall varied by
the self-threateningness of individual behaviors, as would be
expected from our application of the MNE to the intergroup
recall context.
Thus, additional research is needed to clarify why and when
deficits in recall for negative behaviors enacted by others will
emerge. We took a step toward meeting this need in two experi-
ments. Experiment 1 received ethical approval from Northern
Illinois University and Experiment 2 from the University of
Southampton. We provide the research protocol in Supplemen-
tary Material. The data and code for the main analyses are
available at OSF (https://doi.org/10.17605/osf.io/ypr9z).
Experiment 1
Our first experiment modified the typical mnemic neglect para-
digm (Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2009) in which participants
read the descriptions of many behaviors, then later attempt to
recall each behavior. The modification involved manipulating
the nationality of behavior enactors. Some participants read
behaviors describing enactors who shared the participants’
American nationality. For other participants, the enactors’
nationality differed from participants’ nationality.
We used national identity as the self-important reference
group because nationalities can both produce robust in-group
favoritism effects (Koomen & Bähler, 1996) and alter memory
(Rotella & Richeson, 2013). Additionally, this in-group choice
allowed use of a self-neutral referent group (“Andorrans”) ana-
logous to the neutral-other control condition in the standard
MNE paradigm (“Chris”). A targeted question within Experi-
ment 1 confirmed that most participants had never heard of
Andorra (89.10%) or had heard of it but lacked knowledge of
Andorrans (i.e., had never met an Andorran; 8.70%).
Method
Participants
Native U.S. undergraduates, aged 18–26 years (M ¼ 19.75,
SD ¼ 1.84), participated for course credit. We determined
sample size a priori from the results of previous mnemic
neglect experiments (Zengel et al., 2018). We ceased data col-
lection once we reached 100 participants.
We excluded from analyses data from two participants who
exhibited no behavior recall (routine in MNE experiments). Of
the remaining 98 participants (51 men, 46 women, and 1 unde-
clared), most identified as Caucasian (49.0%, African Ameri-
can: 18.4%, Hispanic American: 18.4%, Asian American:
3.1%, mixed ethnicity: 8.2%, and undeclared: 3.1%).
Materials and Procedure
On laboratory arrival, participants confirmed they were native
U.S. citizens, a practice intended to strengthen the accessibility
of their American identity. We randomly assigned the 98 par-
ticipants to the in-group (American: n ¼ 52) or out-group
(Andorran: n ¼ 46) condition.
Our procedure mirrored the typical mnemic neglect para-
digm (Green et al., 2008; Sedikides & Green, 2000), with two
exceptions. First, the behavior feedback referred either to
“Americans” or “Andorrans” rather than the MNE-typical
“I/Me” or “Chris.” Second, in our distractor task (see below),
to avoid activating nationality participants generated names
of birds instead of names of U.S. states (the task often used
in MNE experiments).
Participation occurred via a computer-administered Qual-
trics Survey. In-group (and out-group) condition participants
were instructed to “consider the following description of
AMERICANS (for out-group: ANDORRANS). Think of the
descriptions as being based on actual knowledge of people who
know AMERICANS (for out-group: ANDORRANS) well.
Think of the descriptions as real.”
Participants then read 32 trait-implying sentences that
depicted behaviors enacted by individuals from the partici-
pant’s assigned group (Americans or Andorrans). The beha-
viors and the traits that these behaviors implied duplicated
most MNE experiments (for pretest data, see Sedikides &
Green, 2000). Some behaviors had implications for one of two
(trustworthy, kind) central (e.g., self-important) traits, whereas
other behaviors had implications for one of two (modest,
uncomplaining) peripheral (e.g., not self-important) traits. Half
the behaviors were positive (e.g., Andorrans would help a
handicapped neighbor paint his house) and half were negative
(e.g., Americans would be unfaithful when in an intimate rela-
tionship). Thus, of 32 behaviors viewed by each participant,
four were positive/trustworthy, four negative/trustworthy,
four positive/kind, four negative/kind, four positive/modest,
four negative/modest, four positive/uncomplaining, and four
negative/uncomplaining. Behaviors appeared in an order
randomized separately for each participant. Each behavior
remained visible for 8 s before switching to the next one
(Sedikides & Green, 2000, Experiment 3).
Following a 2.5-min distractor task, participants were unex-
pectedly asked to recall as many of the previously displayed
sentences as possible, report them one at a time in any order
they came to mind, and be as accurate in reporting as possible
without worrying about verbatim recollection. Using a textbox,
participants recorded their memory for a single behavior and
then prompted the computer to present a new blank textbox (for
nuances of memory assessments in regard to timing and
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reporting behaviors one at a time vs. in culmination, see New-
man et al., 2014).
Consistent with its theorized roots in memory search diffi-
culties (i.e., shallow information processing, memorial separa-
tion of the negative information from the predominantly
positive self-concept), the MNE generally emerges when mem-
ory is probed via free recall and not when probed via recogni-
tion (Green et al., 2008). In an attempt to replicate this
distinction, participants next completed a sentence recognition
task. Half of the sentences (old) had been presented earlier in
the experiment, and half were new (i.e., foils adapted from
Green et al., 2008). We displayed all sentences in a separate
random order for each participant. On seeing the 64 sentences,
participants selected different checkboxes to indicate whether
they believed each sentence to be either old or new. Both here
and in Experiment 2, the session concluded by soliciting each
participant’s demographic information, knowledge about
Andorra, and response to a mood-enhancing item (i.e., for what
participants were most grateful for in their lives).
Results and Discussion
Free Recall
Following standard MNE-paradigm procedures, recalled beha-
vior sentences were coded independently by two raters using a
gist criterion.1 Coders agreed on 94.42% of cases, resolving
discrepancies through discussion.
We then calculated recall proportions, counting behaviors
recalled per within-subjects cell of the design (central/positive,
central/negative, peripheral/positive, and peripheral/negative)
and dividing that number by eight. For this tally, we collapsed
across the two traits that comprised each cell of the Trait Type
 Behavior Valence matrix. Next, we entered the proportions
into a 2 (referent group: American, Andorran)  2 (trait type:
central, peripheral)  2 (behavior valence: positive, negative)
mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA). Referent group
was the sole between-subjects variable. We provided means
and standard deviations (SDs) in Table 1.
The typical signature of the MNE, the Referent Group 
Trait Type  Behavior Valence interaction, emerged,
F(1, 96) ¼ 5.89, p ¼ .017, Z2p ¼ .06, 90% CI [.006, .146].2
We decomposed this interaction by first examining the Refer-
ent Group  Behavior Valence interaction within each trait
type. This interaction was not significant for peripheral traits,
F(1, 96)¼ 0.59, p¼ .45, Z2p ¼ .01, but was so for central traits,
F(1, 96) ¼ 4.88, p ¼ .030, Z2p ¼ .05, 90% CI [.003, .133]. We
next probed the latter significant interaction by examining the
simple effect of referent group within each behavior valence.
Participants recalled fewer negative/central behaviors
for Americans (M ¼ 0.13, SD ¼ 0.14) than Andorrans
(M ¼ 0.22, SD ¼ 0.15), F(1, 96) ¼ 8.87, p ¼ .004, Z2p ¼ .08,
90% CI [.017, .181], but recall for positive/central behaviors
did not vary significantly by referent group, F(1, 96) ¼ 0.03,
p ¼ .86, Z2p ¼ .00. Given that interpretations of other effects
that emerged from the analysis are qualified by the significant
three-way interaction, we do not discuss them here but present
them in Supplementary Material.
Recognition
One participant eschewed the recognition task, leaving 97 in
the sample. Using procedures derived from signal detection
theory (Green et al., 2008), we calculated behavior recognition
accuracy values (d) by averaging mean rates of correctly iden-
tified old behavior sentences (hits) with mean rates of correctly
identified new behavior sentences (correct rejections). We cal-
culated these accuracy recognition values separately for each
cell of the within-subjects design and entered the values as
dependent variables into a 2 (referent group)  2 (trait type)
 2 (behavior valence) mixed-model ANOVA. We display
means and SDs in Table 2.
As expected (Cheston et al., 2018; Green et al., 2008;
Zengel et al., 2018), the MNE-evident three-way interaction
that was significant in free recall was not significant in recog-
nition accuracy, F(1, 95) ¼ 1.33, p ¼ .251, Z2p ¼ .01. The sig-
nificant effect that did emerge is irrelevant to the MNE:
Participants manifested higher recognition accuracy for central
(M ¼ 0.81, SD ¼ 0.15) than peripheral (M ¼ 0.76, SD ¼ 0.12)
behaviors, F(1, 95) ¼ 14.82, p < .001, Z2p ¼ .14.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we examined the replicability of Experiment
1 findings, testing participants who identified with a British
national identity. In a between-subjects design, the sentences
referred either to British enactors or Andorran enactors. A tar-
geted question verified that most (61.10%) of the British parti-
cipants had not heard of Andorra or that a substantial minority
of them (35.10%) had heard of Andorra but lacked knowledge
of Andorrans. We expected the MNE results produced by
Table 1. Means (Standard Deviations) [95% CI] for Recall Propor-
tions in Experiment 1.
Referent Group
Central Peripheral
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Americans .25 (.14) .13 (.14) .06 (.10) .09 (.13)
[.21, .29] [.10, .17] [.04, .09] [.06, .13]
Andorrans .25 (.16) .22 (.15) .11 (.11) .11 (.11)
[.21, .30] [.18, .27] [.07, .14] [.08, .15]




Positive Negative Positive Negative
Americans .80 (.18) .81 (.17) .73 (.16) .80 (.15)
Andorrans .80 (.15) .82 (.21) .76 (.18) .77 (.16)
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Experiment 2 to replicate those observed in Experiment 1.
Moreover, we sought evidence that the MNE was driven by
in-group favoritism (Pinter & Greenwald, 2011; Vignoles &
Moncaster, 2007; Wildschut et al., 2014). We measured
in-group favoritism via both a group global evaluative
judgment and judgments about various traits that the group was
perceived to possess.
On the global evaluation measure, we expected that the Brit-
ish group would be judged as more positive than the Andorran
group. We anticipated a different pattern on trait measures.
Prior work has shown that in-group positivity effects are espe-
cially likely on features perceived to be highly important
(or relevant) to the in-group (Mullen et al., 1992; also see
Marques et al., 1988). This finding suggests that British parti-
cipants would favor the British group over the Andorran group
in judgments about the central trait dimensions (trustworthi-
ness, kindness), but less so in judgments about the peripheral
trait dimensions (modesty, uncomplaining). In mediational
analyses, we then tested whether either these evaluative judg-
ments or these trait judgments (or both) could plausibly med-
iate the expected referent group-driven MNE in recall.
Method
Participants
British university undergraduates (N ¼ 166), aged 18–45 years
(M ¼ 20.24, SD ¼ 3.36), participated for course credit. Data
collection started 3 months after the Brexit referendum that
occurred on June 23, 2016. We aimed to test at least 150 parti-
cipants3 and stopped data collection at the end of the designated
academic semester.
We excluded data from two participants who exhibited no
recall. Of the remaining 164 participants (137 women, 21 men,
and six unreported), most identified as White or British White
(64.0%, British Black: 3.7%, British Asian: 4.9%, British or
English without further distinction: 17.7%, mixed ethnicity:
5.5%, other: 1.9%, and undeclared 2.4%). We randomly
assigned participants to the in-group (British: n ¼ 82) or out-
group (Andorran: n ¼ 82) condition.
Materials and Procedure
Materials and procedures duplicated Experiment 1, with two
exceptions. First, in one condition, we changed the nationality
label used in the behavior sentences from “American” to
“British.” Second, we added a judgment task to the procedure,
placing it between recall and recognition.
In this added task, we instructed participants to judge the
group of British or Andorran enactors (depending on condi-
tion), based exclusively on the behaviors that they had just read
(for a similar procedure, see Gramzow et al., 2001; Otten &
Moskowitz, 2000). Participants first provided global evaluative
judgments of their assigned group (3 ¼ very bad, 0 ¼ neither
good nor bad, and þ3 ¼ very good). Participants next rated
how much their assigned group exemplified the traits trust-
worthy, kind, modest, and uncomplaining (e.g., 3 ¼ very
untrustworthy, 0 ¼ neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy, and
þ3 ¼ very trustworthy). To conceal the experiment’s purpose,
we embedded these trait judgments among other trait judg-
ments (e.g., intelligent, polite, creative). All trait ratings were
made on 7-point bipolar scales structured and labeled as in the
example above, but appropriate to the trait being rated.
Results and Discussion
Free Recall
Two independent raters coded the recalled behaviors based on
a gist criterion.4 Their ratings matched in 93.01% of the cases;
discrepancies were resolved via discussion. As in Experiment
1, we tallied the recalled behavior counts and converted them
into proportions. We entered these proportions into a 2 (refer-
ent group: British, Andorran)  2 (trait type: central, periph-
eral)  2 (behavior valence: positive, negative) mixed-model
ANOVA. Means and SDs appear in Table 3.
The expected, MNE-indicative, Referent Group  Trait
Type  Behavior Valence interaction was significant,
F(1, 162) ¼ 4.38, p ¼ .038, Z2p ¼ .03, 90% CI [.001, .079].
Decompositions showed that the Referent Group  Behavior
Valence interaction was significant for central traits,
F(1, 162) ¼ 5.47, p ¼ .021, Z2p ¼ .03, 90% CI [.003, .089], but
not peripheral traits, F(1, 162) ¼ 0.20, p ¼ .654, Z2p ¼ .00. We
probed the significant interaction for central traits by testing the
simple effect of referent group within each behavior valence.
Participants recalled fewer negative central behaviors when the
referent group was British (M ¼ 0.18, SD ¼ 0.13) than Andor-
ran (M ¼ 0.26, SD ¼ 0.15), F(1, 162) ¼ 12.54, p ¼ .001,
Z2p ¼ .07, 90% CI [.021, .142]. In contrast, recall for positive
central behaviors did not vary significantly by referent group,
F(1, 162) ¼ 0.08, p ¼ .78, Z2p ¼ .00. These results duplicate
those observed in Experiment 1, reflecting the emergence
of a group-based MNE. We present other effects, which were
qualified by the significant three-way interaction, in Supple-
mentary Material.
In-Group Favoritism
Evaluative judgments. Three participants eschewed the evalua-
tive judgment task. We examined the evaluative judgments
from the remaining participants via a between-subjects
ANOVA (British vs. Andorrans). As expected from social
identity theory, participants judged their in-group (British;
Table 3. Means (Standard Deviations) [95% CI] for Recall Propor-
tions in Experiment 2.
Referent Group
Central Peripheral
Positive Negative Positive Negative
British .32 (.18) .18 (.13) .13 (.14) .10 (.10)
[.28, .36] [.15, .21] [.10, .16] [.08, .12]
Andorrans .33 (.17) .26 (.15) .15 (.15) .10 (.11)
[.29, .37] [.22, .29] [.12, .18] [.08, .13]
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M ¼ 0.26, SD ¼ 1.15) as better than the out-group (Andorrans:
M ¼ 0.29, SD ¼ 1.18), F(1, 159) ¼ 8.87, p ¼ .003, Z2p ¼ .05.
We used these judgments to test the idea that the MNE
might be driven by in-group favoritism. To do so, we devised
a mediation model (Figure 1) using Model 4 of the PROCESS
macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2009). We included reference group as
a predictor of memory in this model. We derived the memory
outcome variable for each participant from a calculated ratio of
the recall frequency for central negative behaviors to the tally
of memory for all behaviors recalled (recall ratio). We chose
this ratio so that it could provide a single-measure representa-
tion of the entire memory pattern observed in the MNE.
(Results from models using one of the several other memory
measures as outcomes all converged with the results based on
the recall ratio; see Supplementary Material).
The model, depicted in Figure 1, included global evaluative
judgments as a mediator of the referent group–recall ratio rela-
tion. All effects in the model are bootstrapped estimates based
on 10,000 trials. As expected, more positive evaluative judg-
ments were made for the British than the Andorrans, b ¼ .547,
t(159) ¼ 2.979, p ¼ .003, and these evaluative judgments were
negatively related to the recall ratio, b ¼ .036, t(159) ¼ 2.988,
p ¼ .003. More importantly, an indirect effect emerged
(indirect¼.020, SE¼ .011, 95% CI [.046,.003]), showing
that the significant relationship between referent group and the
recall ratio was plausibly explained by evaluative judgments.
Indeed, accounting for the mediated pathway, the direct effect
of referent group on the recall ratio was rendered nonsignificant:
direct ¼ .055, SE ¼ .028, 95% CI [.111, .001].
Trait judgments. We next tested whether participants favored the
in-group over the out-group in judgments, especially for the
central traits of trustworthiness and kindness (as opposed to
the peripheral traits of modesty and uncomplaining). To do
so, we averaged separately judgments for the two central traits
(i.e., kind and trustworthy), r(161)¼ .27, p¼ .001, and the two
peripheral traits (i.e., modest and uncomplaining), r(161)¼ .19,
p ¼ .017.5 We then entered these two averages into a mixed
ANOVA, with referent group (British vs. Andorran) as a
between-subjects variable and trait type (central, peripheral)
as a within-subjects variable.
The expected Referent Group  Trait Type interaction was
significant, F(1, 159) ¼ 4.33, p ¼ .039, Z2p ¼ .03 (Figure 2).
Decomposition analyses revealed that participants judged the
British (M ¼ 0.57, SD ¼ 1.13) more positively on central traits
than they judged the Andorrans (M ¼ 0.04, SD ¼ 1.17),
F(1, 159) ¼ 11.55, p ¼ .001, Z2p ¼ .07. However, on peripheral
traits, participants did not differ in their judgments of the Brit-
ish (M ¼ 0.16, SD ¼ 1.28) and Andorrans (M ¼ 0.32,
SD ¼ 1.19), F(1, 159) ¼ 0.66, p ¼ .419, Z2p ¼ .00.
Two additional main effects (interpretations qualified by the
interaction) emerged from the ANOVA: (a) Participants judged
the groups more positively on central (M ¼ 0.27, SD ¼ 1.19)
than on peripheral (M ¼ 0.24, SD ¼ 1.23) traits,
F(1, 159) ¼ 20.66, p < .001, Z2p ¼ .12, and (b) participants
judged the in-group (M ¼ 0.21, SD ¼ 1.01) more positively
than the out-group (M ¼ 0.18, SD ¼ 0.92),
F(1, 159) ¼ 6.46, p ¼ .012, Z2p ¼ .04.
We also used these judgments to test again the idea that
behavior recall might be driven by in-group favoritism. This
should be more likely for central (than peripheral) trait judg-
ments. We devised two mediation models, each similar to that
depicted in Figure 1. One model used the central trait index as
the mediator of the referent group–recall ratio relation and the
other used the peripheral trait index as the mediator. Results
from these mediation models suggested, in contrast to results
from the mediation model using evaluative judgments, that trait
judgments were not a plausible mediator of the referent group–
recall ratio relation: central judgments: indirect ¼ .014,
SE¼.011, 95% CI [.036, .003]; peripheral judgments:
indirect ¼ .0001, SE ¼ .003, 95% CI [.007, .006].
Recognition
Three participants bypassed the recognition task, so the analy-
ses of the data from this task included responses only from the
remaining 161 participants. For this analysis, as in Experiment
1, we calculated a separate recognition accuracy index (i.e., the
average of mean hit rates and mean correct rejection rates) for
each cell of the within-subjects design. Subsequently, we
entered the averages into a 2 (referent group)  2 (trait type)
 2 (behavior valence) mixed-model ANOVA. We present
means and SDs in Table 4.
Figure 1. In-group favoritism (evaluative judgments) as a mediator of






















Figure 2. Trait judgments as a function of referent group and trait
type in Experiment 2.
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Prior research has not found MNE on recognition tasks.
Congruently, the three-way interaction for the recognition data
in Experiment 2 was not significant, F(1, 159) ¼ 0.02,
p ¼ .891, Z2p ¼ .00.
However, two significant effects emerged. Participants
manifested higher recognition accuracy for central
(M ¼ 0.84, SD ¼ 0.11) than peripheral (M ¼ 0.80,
SD ¼ 0.11) behaviors, F(1, 159) ¼ 37.86, p < .001,
Z2p ¼ .19. In addition, the Referent Group  Behavior Valence
interaction was significant, F(1, 159) ¼ 8.65, p ¼ .004,
Z2p ¼ .05. Decompositions of this interaction showed that,
when Andorran was the referent, the simple valence effect was
not significant, F(1, 78)¼ 2.19, p¼ .143, Z2p ¼ .03. In contrast,
when British was the referent, positive behaviors (M ¼ 0.84,
SD ¼ 0.10) were recognized better than negative behaviors
(M ¼ 0.81, SD ¼ 0.12), F(1, 81) ¼ .36, p ¼ .008, Z2p ¼ .08.
General Discussion
In two experiments, we found that participant recall for self-
central negative behaviors enacted by others can be impaired
when the behaviors emanate from those who share a partici-
pant’s nationality. To illustrate the strength of this effect, in one
additional ANOVA, we combined the recall data from Experi-
ments 1 and 2. The MNE-indicative three-way interaction
emerged for the combined data set and was robust: Referent
Group  Trait Type  Behavior Valence interaction,
F(1, 260) ¼ 9.64, p ¼ .002, Z2p ¼ .04, 90% CI [.008, .080];
Referent Group  Behavior Valence interaction for central
traits, F(1, 260) ¼ 9.95, p ¼ .002, Z2p ¼ .04, 90% CI [.008,
.081]; and valence effect in recall for negative/central behaviors,
F(1, 260) ¼ 21.78, p < .001, Z2p ¼ .08, 90% CI [.033, .133].
However, follow-up investigations are needed to delineate
the boundaries of these findings and understand better their the-
oretical underpinnings. For example, we assumed that the same
cognitive mechanisms (i.e., shallow encoding of threatening
behaviors, memorial separation of threatening behaviors from
the self-concept) thought to drive the MNE for self-behavior
recall also apply to the social-identity driven MNE. This con-
clusion is supported by our Experiment 1 finding, where, as
in the typical MNE paradigm, no identity-driven memory rec-
ognition deficits emerged despite the emergence of such effects
in the free recall data.
However, collapsing across trait type, identity-driven recog-
nition deficits did appear in Experiment 2. Given that this latter
interaction did not emerge in Experiment 1, we suggest that it
should be viewed with caution. Nonetheless, we also note that
similar effects have appeared elsewhere. For example, Dalton
and Huang (2013) found that social identity threat (i.e., nega-
tive identity-related feedback) impaired recognition memory
for identity-relevant advertisements. For example, students
who read a newspaper article about how their university was
underperforming were less likely to recognize an ad offering
a discount at the campus bookstore than students who read
an unrelated (nonthreatening) article. Although often explained
by the use of general terms such as “motivated forgetting,”
such effects could reflect any of numerous specific
mechanisms.
One such mechanism is grounded in the difficulties of
encoding the meaning of expectancy-inconsistent behaviors:
It is hard for a person to understand things that do not fit their
existing knowledge. This understanding difficulty could yield
an especially weak memory trace for negative in-group beha-
viors, which should lead both to low recognition rates and poor
free recall. Another mechanism is grounded in guessing
tendencies on recognition tasks. In the absence of actual recog-
nition, people often use their expectancies to make plausible
expectancy-consistent recognition guesses. Thus, if one
expects a group to be positive, in the absence of any recognition
memory, one might still guess that the group behaves posi-
tively. So, in the absence of recognition memory, when choos-
ing from an array of possible reference group behaviors where
one of the foils is positive, people may make a guess and
choose that positive foil instead of the correct negative beha-
vior. This choice would produce a low recognition rate for neg-
ative in-group behaviors.
These considerations point to several courses of action.
First, it is important to attempt to replicate the recognition
interaction effect that emerged from Experiment 2. Doing so
would indicate an interesting phenomenon: The mechanisms
that operate when processing information about in-group and
out-group behaviors (where impairment effects on both recall
and recognition measures are observed) might differ from the
mechanisms that operate when processing information about
the behaviors of individuals (self vs. neutral other, where an
impairment effect is observed on recognition measures, but not
on recall measures). If such a group target versus individual tar-
get difference occurs, then the next step would be to document
mental processes operative in the intergroup case that might be
absent in the single actor case. For example, signal detection
tasks and analyses are designed to assess the extent to which
recognition responding is affected by guessing tendencies.
Hence, such tasks and analyses can be used to find out whether
guessing is involved in the recognition effect observed in the
intergroup case.
A second focus of new research could target the assumption
that the MNE we obtained was ultimately grounded in the
extent to which an individual is positive toward their national-
ity (as opposed to a different nationality). The assumption
about high own-nationality positivity is strongly supported by
prior research (Dimitriadou et al., 2019; Koomen & Bähler,
1996; Rotella & Richeson, 2013). Moreover, the hypothesis




Positive Negative Positive Negative
British .87 (.12) .84 (.13) .81 (.11) .79 (.14)
Andorrans .84 (.14) .85 (.12) .79 (.13) .81 (.12)
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that in-group positivity could mediate the social-identity-based
MNE was supported in our mediational modeling that mea-
sured group positivity via an evaluative measure. However, the
mediational idea was not supported by modeling that examined
whether in-group positivity as assessed via trait judgments
could mediate the social-identity-based MNE. This difference
may have emerged because the trait judgments are a less pure
or powerful measure of in-group positivity than global evalua-
tive judgments. Regardless, follow-up research would do well
to replicate the mediational effect produced by the global eva-
luations and to understand better why the in-group positivity
mediation effect occurred for the global evaluation judgment
measure and not for the trait judgment measure.
Third and last, future work could provide convergent valid-
ity for the idea that nationality-driven identification and posi-
tivity caused the recall impairments that we found. For
example, an experiment could compare the MNE effect
observed in individuals who strongly identify with a positive
in-group to the effect observed in those who only weakly
identify with the same positive in-group. Such research could
also directly measure the amount of threat posed by negative
in-group behaviors, presumably showing that strong in-group
identification produces both high threat from negative
in-group behavior and poor memory for that behavior.
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Notes
1. A recalled item was not counted if it (a) did not reflect actual beha-
vior gist, (b) had been recalled previously, and (c) misreported
valence (e.g., “Americans would never lie to their parents” instead
of “Americans would often lie to their parents”). Data from four
participants contained three or more such intrusions. Analyses
excluding these participants (as in Sedikides & Green, 2000,
2004) yielded results virtually identical to those reported.
2. We report 90% confidence intervals for Z2 because the F distribu-
tion is one sided (Steiger, 2004).
3. We determined the Experiment 1 sample size (N ¼ 100) based on
the results of previous mnemic neglect experiments. However, a
post hoc power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) revealed
that we only achieved power ¼ .65 for the key Referent Group 
Trait Type  Behavior Valence interaction effect on recall propor-
tions (Z2p ¼ .06 or Cohen’s f ¼ .24). We therefore increased the
sample size for Experiment 2 to secure power ¼ .80 to detect the
effect size observed in Experiment 1 (f¼ .24; a¼ .05). Our a priori
power analysis yielded a target sample size of 139, which we
exceeded to account for attrition.
4. Data from 12 participants contained three or more intrusions. Anal-
yses that excluded those participants yielded similar results to those
reported.
5. Separate analyses for each of the two central traits and each of the
two peripheral traits produced results similar to the reported ones.
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